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IN THE SUPRF.l\JIE COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE GALE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 7944

FLOYD C. GALE,
D·efenda,nt amd Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This i'S an app·eal from a Judgment enteTed November 21, 1952, modifying a pTeviously ·entered Decree in
respect to support money payments by increasing the
total which appellant was ordered to pay from $100.00 to
$140.00 a month (R. p. 7). Under the original Decree of
the court, appellant was ordered to pay the sum of $100.00
a month for the support of his minor children at such
time as he resumed employment or wa'S able to resume
employment (R. p·. 7). For many years p:rior to the time
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of the divorce, appellant had been employed as a bus
driver with the Greyhound Lines, but for some time prior
to the Divorce Decree appellant had been very ill and
was undergoing treatm·ent at the State Hospital at Provo,
Utah, (R. p. 22), although he was out of the hospital at
the time of the divorce (R. p. 25). Prior to appellant's
sicknes'S, he had been bringing home approximately
$300.00 per month net pay from his job, and it was on
this basis of his income that the Decre·e was made (R. p.
2'3). In the first part of August of 1951, appellant returned to work for the company and ever since that time
has made the payments ordered under the Decree (R. p.
31). On or about November 7, 1952, re'Spondent filed a
Petition for Modification of Decree and the same was set
for hearing by an Order to Show Cause on the 18th day of
November, 1952 (R. p.ll).
S'TATEME·NT OF POINTS
UPON WHICH THE APPELLANT RELIE'S
POINT I.
R.ESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF
THE COURT'S DECREE DOES NOT STATE OR ALLEGE
ANY FACTS OR ANY SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UPON
WHICH THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN SAID PETITION
COULD BE GRANTED, AND APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS MADE AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING ON
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RENEWED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AT
SAID HEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED.
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE TAKEN UPON THE HEARING OF
RESPONDENT'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE DOES
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER OF COURT ENTERED IN SAID
MATTER ON NOVEMBER 21, 1952.

POINT III.
NO MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR PERMANENT
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WAS SHOWN BY RESPONDENT AT THE HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION.

POINT IV.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ORDER THE
APPELLANT TO PAY INCREASED SUMS IN VIEW OF HIS
ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN RELIANCE
UPON THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF THE COURT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF
THE COURT'S DECREE DOES NOT STATE OR ALLEGE
ANY FACTS OR ANY SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UPON
WHICH THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN SAID PETITION
COULD BE GRANTED, AND APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS MADE AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING ON
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RENEWED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AT
SAID HEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED.

The Petition for Modification of Decree (R. p. 8),
filed in the court below by resp·ondent did not allege any
facts whatsoever which would fairly app~raise the appel-
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lant of what facts respondent intended to rely on in the
hearing on said Petition for an increase in support
money.. The Petition alleged as a conclu'Sion that the
appellant had "bettered his financial condition and is
able to pay a more reasonable sum for the support of
said minor children in accordance with present living
costs; .that the requirements of the four children have
. increased since the entry of said Divorce Decree". In
no particular did 'Said Petition allege or set forth or state
in any way that there had been a material or substantial
and permanent change of conditions from those \rhich
existed at the time of the entry of the original Decree.
Nowhere were there any facts alleged to show in \rhnt
way the circumstances or requirements of the said children had increased or were different from what they were
at the time of the entry of the Decree· and there were no
facts alleged as a· basis of respondent's conclusion that the
app~ellant had "bettered his financial condition". It has
long been the law in this state that a petition for modification of alimony or support awarded in a Divorce Decree must state facts sufficient to authorize its modification, Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76. In
Cody vs. Cody, 47 U. 456, 145 P. 952, at page 954 in the
Pacific Reporte·r, in regard to the interpretation of the
statute whereby the court derives its power to modify a
Divorce Decree, the court uses the following language:
"What was contemplated by the statute· was
that where a court had granted a divorce decree
and had allowed alimony, or had 1nade distribution
of property and disposal of children, either party
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could thereafter come· into court and allege that
since the entry of the original decree material
and permanent changes had taken place."
It is apparent froni a reading of respondent's Petition
for Modification that it does not state or allege facts or
grounds upon which relief could be granted and appellant's Motion to Dismiss (R. p. 13), made at the outset
of the hearing and before any evidence was taken should
have been granted. At the conclusion of the evidence offered on the hearing of the Petition, appellant renewed
his Motion to Dismiss (R. p·. 39), and the Motion should
have been granted again at that time because it is obvious
from a reading of the transcript of the evidence belov.T
(R. pages 17- 42) that respondent did not even sustain
the conclusions alleged in her Petition that the appellan.t
had "bettered his financial condition", nor is there one
single word of evidence in this record to show that the
requirements of the four minor children have increased
any or at all since the entry of the divorce decree as it was
alleged in respondent's Petition for Modification (R. p.
8).
The appellant was forced into court to defend this
Petition for Modification and increase without any indication or idea as to what facts he would be required to
meet. It is clearly the law in this jurisdiction as set forth
in the Cody and Chaffee cases supra that a party should
not be subjected to proceedings for the reopening and
modification of prior divorce decrees except on pleadings
which allege facts and grounds which show that there

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

has been a material or substantial and permanent change
of the circumstances of either of the partie'S or both of
them since the entry of the original decree.

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE TAKEN UPON THE HEARING OF
RESPONDENT'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE DOES
NOT SUPPORT. THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER OF COURT ENTERED IN SAID
MATTER ON NOVEMBER 21, 1952.

'The Findings of Flact and Conclusions of Law (R. p.
14), entered by the court below on November 21, 1952, in
paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact, recite that since
the entry of said Divorce Decree the financial condition
of the appellant has been bettered that he is now gainfully employed. This is the only finding of a factual na. ture what'Soever to support the court's order increasing
support payments. There is no finding as to what the appellant's financial condition was at the time· of the divorce
decree'; there is no finding in regard to the requirements
of the minor children at the time of the decree or at the,
time of the hearing on the Order To Show c·ause why
the support payments should be increa'Sed; there is no
finding that the appellant's financial condition has been
bettered materially or substantially and permanently;
as a matter of fact, the record is utterly devoid of any
findings of fact which would lead to the conclusion that
the moving party below, the respondent, had alleged
and p·roved changed condition'S arising since the entry
of the decree which require under the rules of equity and
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justice a change in the decree, which test has been held
to be the applicable test by which the court is to determine
whether or not a decree will be modified in every single
case in this court in which the question has been under
consideration; a'S stated in Osrnus vs. Osmus, found at
198 P. (2d) 233 on page 236 of the Pacific Reporter:
"It is a principle now firmly established in
this jurisdiction that to entitle either party to ·'1
modification of a decree of alimony or support
money, that such party plead and prove a change
in circumstances such as to require, in fairne'Ss and
equity, a change in the terms of the decree."
and see also earlier Utah Cases therein cited.
The appellant produced for the court below by Exhibit I ~d Exhibit II a complete summary of every cent
earned by appellant both gross and net. In Exhibit I for
the 12-month period prior to his illne'Ss and the divorce,
and by Exhibit II for the 15-nJonth period since the divorce to the time of the hearing on the Petition for Modification. Exhibit I shows that for the 12-month period
prior to the divorce appellant's net monthly income was
$329.25. E·xhibit II shows that for the 15-month period
since the divorce appellant's net monthly income averaged $309.28. So that the evidence clearly shows that
actually at the time of the hearing on the Petition for
Modification appellant was making or had been making a
net of $20.00 a month les'S than what he was earning at
the time prior to the divorce and his illness.
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Appellant is a bus driver for the Overland Greyhound Lines and has been for the past nine or nine and
one-half years (R. p. 28). The drivers for that company
are paid upon the ba'Sis of a certain rate per mile and
at the time of the divorce appellant was receiving by
reason of his length of service with the company, seniority, etc., the sum of seven and one-fourth cents per n1ile
driven, and at the time of the he·aring for modification
he was still at this same rate of pay (R. p. 28). The
drivers for that company, according to the length of time
they have been there, may bid on the various runs or
lines which runs or driving periods to various towns last
for approximately three or four months before they are
up for rebid (R. p. 28). The runs are different in tin1e
and miles and therefore the income which a driver makes
depends upon the particular run which he is able to secure
every three or four month'S 'vhen the runs come up fot
bid. These. various runs are bid on by the various drivers
under a system of seniority at the company which 1neans
that drivers according to the length of time they have
been there may bid on the various lines (R. p. 28). Appellant's seniority allows him to be in such a bidding
position in relation to the other drivers that he can securP.
for himself the equivalent of a Salt Lake to Pocatello run
which puts him in a position that he knows by virtue of
his seniority status that he can secure a run during Paeh
bidding period which will insure that he makes about a
net of $300.00 per month (R. p. 29). At the time of the
hearing on the Petition for Modification and for approximately three months prior thereto (R. p. 25) appellant
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had been on the Salt Lake to Idaho Falls and return run
which is the longest paying run on the division (R. p. 29)
and which accounts for the fact that at the time of the
hearing the appellant was actually receiving a higher
income than at any time since or before the divorce, but
it was only a temporary and not a permanent increase.
Appellant got that higher paying run at the last bidding
because no one with greater seniority hap·pened to bid
and that run was contemplated for a rebid on the first
of December, 1952, and appellant had no assurance that
he would be able to bid on that higher paying run (R. p.
29). So it can be seen that the monthly income of drivers
for the Greyhound Lines will vary over the months during
the year according to what run they are able to bid in on,
but that there will be an average net income which a man
is able to make because of his length of time with the company and it is submitted that at the time of the hearing
for modification below that appellant's monthly net in- '
come was 'Still only $309.28 p·er month even including in
the averaging to arrive at that'figure the 2 or 3 preceeding months during which appellant had received his
highest monthly income, so that the only possible way that
a fair and accurate determination of what ap·pellant's
. monthly income is, is to average it out in the way in which
it was done in Exhibit I and Exhibit II, and it is apparent
from these Exhibits and the other te'Stimony and evidence
adduced at the hearing that there has been no· material
or substantial and permanent "betterment of appellant'R
financial condition", since the time of the original decree.
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POINT III.
NO MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR PERMANENT
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WAS SHOWN BY RESPONDENT AT THE HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION.

That there must be a permanent as well as a material
change in circumstances in order to entitle a party to a
modification is amply supported by the ca'Ses of Chaffee
vs. Chaffee, supra, and Carson vs. Carson, 87 U. 1, -17 P.
(2d) 894. In the Carson vs. Carson case, supra, at page
896 of the Pacific Reports, this court 'Said the following:
"In a proper case the amount of alimony
awarded in a decree of divorce may be changed,
R. ·s .Utah, 1933, 40-3-5. (Now 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953).
The party to a divorce, however, is not entitled tt)
a modification of the decree of divorce in the absence of a showing that there has been a material
and permanent change of conditions since the
entry of the decree," and further cases cited there··
lll.

There can be no question that the original decree· wa~
based on the premi'Se· that the appellant was earning an
income of approximately $300.00 a month net. The fact
was alleged to be so in paragraph 6 of the respondent's
original complaint in the divorce action (R. p. 1), and the
evidence at the hearing on the Petition to Modify clearly
so indicates. Starting at page 22 of the Record the following questions were· put to the respondent and the following answers given by her:
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

This decreed amount of support money at that
time wa'S based on what you knew his income
was on his job up until the time he got sick~
His sickness had a great effect on it too.
Up to that time he had been bringing home
$300 net pay from his job~
Yes.
It was on that basis that the decree was made Y
Yes.
A'Ssuming he had been able to go back to work
and earn $300 again and pay you~
I asked this lawyer for three hundred to begin
with.
I asked you whether or not it was based on the
$300~

A. Yes.
The fact that at the time the decree was actually
entered the appellant was not 'vorking was considered and
taken into account at that time by the court because the
decree ordered the ap·pellant to pay nothing until he returned or was able to return to work so surely it would
be a mo'St specious argument to maintain the position
that at the actual date of the signing of the decree the
appellant was unemployed and at the time of the hearing
on the Petition for Modification he was emp~loyed because
an examination of the Complaint (R. p. 1) ·and Stipulation for Property Settlement (R. p·. 4) and the Findings
of F'act and Conclusions of Law (R. p. 5) and the Decree
of Divorce (R. p·. 7) in the original action all show that
it was recognized that the appellant was not at that time
working and the entire Decree was based upon the as'SUmption that the appellant would pay the amount order-
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ed if and when he was able to return to work and the
amount to be paid was based upon the assumption that
appellant would he able to resume his employment and
regain his approximate net income of $300.00 per 1nonth,
which he had earned prior to the divorce and his sickness~
and this wa'S exactly the fact and exactly what happened.
Appellant did return to work as contemplated in August,
1951; he did regain his income as it was contemplated
he would, and then he commenced the payments under
the Decree as ordered by the court.
In effect, what the court below in the original decree
actually did was to take cognizance of the fact that the
appellant was at that particular moment unemployed and
decree that he pay nothing in view of that circun1stance
and then provided that the decree should become operative upon the happening of a condition subsequent.

POINT IV.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ORDER THE
APPELLANT TO PAY INCREASED SUMS IN VIEW OF HIS
ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN RELIANCE
UPON THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF THE COURT.

Appellant's illness at and prior to the ti1ne of their.
divorce was caused by the marital trouble existing hetween the parties. Appellant did not want the divorce.
He made 1nany attempts to reconcile with the respondent
for the benefit and welfare of his children and she refused
him (R. P'· 30), and then in reliance upon the original Decree of the court appellant undertook the obligation of a
new marriage (R. p. 31), and that at the tilne of the hear-
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ing below appellant and hi'S second wife were expecting a
child (R. p. 32). Respondent never up until the time, of
appellant's second marriage ever asked for or indicated
to appellant that she needed any more money to support
these children. It was only after she learned of appellant's second marriage that she determined to institute
the proceedings which resulted in the order from which
the appellant appeals (R. p. 31).
If the order of the lower court modifying the original
Decree in this case is affirmed by this court in view of the
facts and circumstances of this case, it would mean that
in the future no man could rely upon a decree of court
determining his obligations. It would mean that a man
could never in good faith and without any attempt to
evade his legal obligation'S for supporting his children as
determined by the court attempt to seek some hap·piness
and life for himself by virtue of a new attempt with a new
partner at matrimonial happiness. If appellant's income
or circumstances had materially and substantially
changed for the better in thi'S case, of course, an entirely
different situation would be presented and a man coul:l
reasonably expect that if his position improved he could
be called upon t~ increase the support payments, but the
effect of an increase in a case of this type if permitted by
this court could prove disa'Strous to all parties concerned,
and would be most unfair to a man in the appellant's position who attempted to plan for a new marriage in reliance
upon the original Decree and without any intent whatsoever to evade his obligations as set forth by that Decree.
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CONCLUSION
It appears that what the court below really attempted
to do in this case wa'S to rewrite the original Decree n1ore
in conformity with what the court thought that the original Decree should have provided, and it is respectfully
submitted that from the earliest cases in this jurisdiction
that that is precisely what thi'S court has stated over and
over again that the lower court may not do, and that there
is nothing contained in this record which justifies under
the law of this jurisdiction a modification of the original
Decree in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.
411 Ut~h Oil Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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